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Introduction 
The 2016 election cycle has shown a dramatic radicalization of the right, 
featuring elements such as out-group demonization, law and order rhetoric, and 
populist strategies that have not been so prevalent in the US since the rise of Nixon’s 
Silent Majority in the 1970s. President Donald Trump campaigned on a platform of 
keeping the morally corrupt out of government, insisting that the “swamp” of 
Washington had been taken over by elitist voices disconnected from middle class 
interests. He aligned himself wholeheartedly with a familiar American identity 
constructed by early populist traditions in the conservative party. Donald Trump, 
according to his campaign, was an ally of the working class masses seeking to make 
their fortune in the American tradition of hard work, self-discipline, and 
righteousness. He condemned the lawless foreigners, coming into America and 
stealing away jobs, driving down the minimum wage, and “shaking down” tax-
paying Americans with “outrageously mismanaged” welfare programs. He stood on 
the side of righteous cops, “the most mistreated people in America,” praising the 
role they play in upholding law and order because they know who the “illegal 
immigrant gang members are.”1  
The UK has experienced a similar ideological shift, though its emergence has 
perhaps not been so notoriously outspoken. All the same, the fervent anti-statist and 
anti-elitist narrative employed by the Leave Campaign is starkly similar to language 
historically associated with the populist rhetoric of the Far Right. Groups such as the 
UK Independence Party have been quietly gaining political influence, promoting 
                                                        
1 Taken from a speech given to the Major Cities Chiefs Police Association, transcript 
provided by The Hill staff. 
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ideals such as immigration crackdowns, zealous patriotism and a refusal to 
institutionalize multiculturalism.2 
Traditionally, these sentiments have been most prevalent among extremist 
parties, operating on the fringes of society and failing to capture majority support. 
In fact, the median voter theorem would suggest that it is their extremism that 
prevents them from ever gaining political salience, given that campaigns appealing 
to voters at the center have the greatest chance of attracting a winning majority. 
However, moderate conservatives have historically been drawn into support of 
radicalized political agendas through the use of the very language and political 
strategies we are seeing in both the UK and the US. These strategies are familiar to 
the conservative party, as the right has utilized narratives fraught with paranoia and 
leveled against the ruling elite to promote agendas of increased nationalism, state 
control, and social conservatism in the past, particularly in times of racial unrest and 
economic decline.3 The implementation of these strategies has historically been 
carefully orchestrated, raising questions about what ideological shifts in the 
electorate they are meant to capture, and what prompted a return to such strategies 
in what is undoubtedly, on the part of the US President, a much more blatant form.  
One answer to this perplexing question may be the considerable success of 
the Far Right in elections over the last decade. In 2013, the Sweden Democrats, Far 
Right party founded in 1988 to promote nationalism and social conservatism, 
secured two seats in the European Parliament for the first time since their founding, 
                                                        
2 Taken from the UKIP manifesto, available on ukip.org 
3 See Matthew Lassiter’s The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 
and Richard Hofstadter’s essay “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” for 
historical examples of these strategies.  
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winning 13% of the popular vote and tripling their vote-share since the last election 
(Renman 2014). In Italy, the Northern League party has been steadily growing its 
base of support, clinching 16-17 percent support in nationwide polls with its anti-
government, anti-cosmopolitan campaign.4 Although progress toward electoral 
representation has been slow for parties in Hungary, the Netherlands, and Denmark, 
Shuster (2016) argues that pressure exerted by right-wing party supporters has 
shifted central party policy rightward, demanding tighter refugee policies, stronger 
borders, and stronger protection in international markets in all three states. 
Furthermore, parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s National 
Front (FN), have gained tangible positions in their respective governments, with AfD 
holding seats in 10 of Germany’s 16 state parliaments and FN winning 6.8 million 
votes out of 25 million in regional elections last year (Shuster 2016). In fact, in 2016 
Austria was nearly the first European country to elect a far right party president 
since World War II, with Freedom Party candidate Norbert Hofer winning 46.7% of 
votes.5  
Political scientists have attempted to make sense of this rising popularity 
through analyses of economic decline, domestic security, and national sovereignty, 
each of which will be explored in this account. However, I contend that popularity of 
these parties is fundamentally based on the rhetorical strategies that we have seen 
employed timelessly by the right. Racial tensions fomented by foreigner 
                                                        
4 For further reading on Italy’s Nothern League see Paravicini, Guilia. “Italy’s far 
right jolts back from dead.” Politico, February 3, 2016.  
5 McKenzie, Sheena. “Austria presidential election: Who is Norbert Hofer?” CNN, 
December 4, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/02/politics/austrian-election-
norbert-hofer-profile/ (accessed April 11, 2017).  
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demonization, economic frustrations pinned on immigrant workers, and perceived 
threats to national security posed by increasing globalization and liberalization each 
induce fear and urgency in frustrated voters. The backlash represented by Far Right 
popularity can be reduced to carefully manipulated anxieties over loss of power as 
well as economic and international insecurity. Furthermore, the adoption of this 
rhetoric by center right parties represents the acknowledgement of these rising 
tensions and the desire to coopt their influence on a national stage. Rather than the 
radical right codifying their language to attract moderate conservative voters as we 
saw in the US during the years of Goldwater and Nixon, what we are seeing now in 
the ideological shift of the center right is the radicalization of language to appeal to 
an increasingly anxious electorate. 
In order to explore the influence that the Far Right has had on traditional 
centrist parties, we must first explore their own ideologies and the language they 
have used to popularize them. This study will draw upon the ideologies of four 
parties from four separate states at various stages in their organization. The first is 
Golden Dawn, which has prompted a considerable amount of critical attention in 
recent years due to its popularity despite a starkly fascist agenda. Next we will 
analyze Alternative for Germany, a traditionally conservative party that is rapidly 
becoming more radical as social anxieties increase. Next will be France’s National 
Front, a party that despite becoming ostensibly more centrist since its change in 
leadership from Jean-Marie Le Pen to daughter Marine Le Pen, has maintained much 
of its party platform and political agenda. Finally we shall analyze the UK 
Independence Party, a coalition that has gained considerable influence since its 
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leadership during the EU referendum. It is useful to understand the various 
platforms of the Far Right, and their considerable differences, to understand the 
way the narratives of these parties have been crafted to promote their political 
agendas.  
Drawing on analyses of economic, socio-cultural, and geopolitical trends that 
have changed the status quo of each of these countries in the post-crisis era, I 
attempt to elucidate potential factors that have made Far Right narratives of fear, 
paranoia, and insecurity particularly salient. I connect the consistencies of their 
respective narratives with prevalent sentiments in the electorate through the 
analysis of studies relating to out-group hostility and perceived economic and 
political insecurity. Finally, I analyze the presence of similar rhetorical devices 
within centrist parties both in the UK and US. These states have been chosen not 
purely because of the relevance of this analysis given recent political events, but also 
because they represent hegemonic political actors in the international arena. Both 
have held positions of military and economic dominance in recent history, and both 
have taken leadership roles in the development of the modern political order.  
 
The Ideology of the Far Right 
The ideology of the far right has eluded clear categorization in the past. Paul 
Hockenos contends that right wing ideology is based in “simplistic programs and 
impassioned rhetoric” rather than a consistent shared platform (Hockenos 2010). 
Furthermore, David Art (2013) emphasizes the “different forms” of far right 
representation in “various national contexts,” contrasting the way different 
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European parties that claim to be far right represent themselves to the populace. 
Platforms held by far right parties can and often do vary from one another 
drastically. For example, although FN and UKIP have been linked repeatedly in the 
past decade, their economic policies are starkly different, with the UKIP supporting 
pro-business liberalization reforms and the FN calling for nationalization of French 
banks and certain industrial sectors. Yet, despite these differences, they share a 
resolute stance on a few controversial issues that are quickly gaining salience in a 
globalizing Europe.  
Firstly, far right parties typically align themselves with an adherence to 
traditional Judeo-Christian social norms, such as the importance of upholding 
morality, industriousness, and social hierarchy. Although submission to authorities 
imposing discipline is considered a virtue in conservative political theory, the 
involvement of the state in the private sphere is abhorred and resisted dutifully 
(Robin 2011). Much like traditional center-right parties, the far right prizes the 
natural hierarchy of social order and seeks to conserve its course of careful 
construction against the tide of radical leftism. Because of this, a crucial factor of far 
right ideology reminiscent of conservatism is an aversion to social deviance, 
especially in the form of what is perceived as social and religious immorality 
(Mudde 2014).  
Immigration is perhaps the single most centrally discussed issue among 
emerging far right parties, especially given the influx of immigrants in northern 
Europe since destabilization in the Middle East brought about by the Arab Spring. 
Far right parties share varying degrees of nativistism, a term Mudde defines as a 
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“combination of nationalism and xenophobia, holding that a country should be 
exclusively inhabited by members of the native group and that non-native elements 
(persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation state” 
(Mudde 2014).  
Beyond immigration, the platforms of far right parties begin to vary more 
dramatically. However, an emphasis on sovereignty and reduced economic 
interdependence can also be consistently found across far right parties, especially in 
the months following the succession of Britain from the European Union. UKIP 
established itself in its own manifesto as being the only party “united in backing a 
Leave vote in the EU referendum” from the early stages of the campaign. Its 
ideological and financial contributions to the campaign undoubtedly contributed to 
the UK’s exit from the Union, as well as its vocal condemnation of “endless Brussels-
imposed red tape” and policies promoting “amnesty for illegal immigrants.”6 The 
importance of overturning this last policy is listed in UKIP’s 2016 manifesto as being 
the same priority level as increasing the strictness of laws banning statutory rape 
and illegal drug use.  
However, UKIP is not the only far right party that has protested increasing 
European integration. The AfD has come out strongly against German involvement 
in the Eurozone and has repeatedly promised a referendum to reinstate an 
independent German currency.7 In fact, the AfD was originally formed in opposition 
to bailouts of Southern European countries, specifically Greece. As AfD became 
increasingly radicalized, economist leaders have stepped aside and power has 
                                                        
6 Taken from the UKIP manifesto. 
7 “What does Alternative for Germany (AfD) want?” BBC, September 5, 2016. 
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shifted within the party, but economic interests focused on decentralization of 
European power remain an important draw for AfD’s electorate. The FN has also 
repeatedly claimed to be in favor of leaving the EU and forming a pan-European 
union that includes Switzerland and Russia.8 Their highly protectionist economic 
policy calls for the reinstatement of the Franc as France’s currency, as well as the 
unilateral rejection of the TTIP, a trade partnership between the EU and US.9 The 
FN’s manifesto also calls for the dissolution of the Schengen Area, a zone instituted 
by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 that allows for the free movement of citizens of 
the European Union throughout its 26 member states. These and other policies laid 
out in the FN manifesto have been proposed in order to “claw back national 
sovereignty” in the face of rising European integration.  
Although they do not align themselves publicly with the parties mentioned 
above, there are a number of political parties exhibiting ideological similarities with 
the far right that have made waves in international headlines in recent years. 
Although members of the Leave Campaign typically belong to Britain’s conservative 
party, when prompted to speak on issues such as immigration, national sovereignty, 
and economic interdependence, their views are strikingly similar to those of the 
UKIP. In the months before the referendum, the party implored voters to “take back 
control” of British immigration law, as well as empower their country to “dictate 
trade agreements that put Britain first” and prevent the “independence of Britain” 
                                                        
8 “Marine Le Pen vots to put France first at National Front party conference.” DW, 
February 5, 2017.  
9 Ibid. 
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from being “severely compromised,” showing stark ideological alignment with the 
nationalistic views of the UKIP (Johnson, 2016).  
 
Explanations of the Popularity of the Far Right 
The recent success of these parties has been attributed to a number of 
different factors. The vast majority of literature on the topic discusses the impact of 
economic crisis and socioeconomic insecurity on out-group hostility. Van Assche 
agues that economic scarcity tends to worsen the social divide between native 
resident and immigrant, prompting conflicts “related to control over economic 
resources, superiority, and power” (Van Assche 2016). This is especially true among 
the less educated, with research consistently showing anti-immigration sentiment 
most prominent among those with the fewest years of formal education (Creighton 
2014). A popular means of explaining this phenomenon has been Realistic Group 
Conflict Theory, which finds that “intergroup hostility is produced by the existence 
of conflicting goals” such as competition in an environment of economic scarcity 
(Jackson 1993). O’Connell, as well as other researchers, extend this theory to show 
that “racism… as well as discriminatory actions, even ‘hate crimes’ and ultimately 
genocide, are at least partially explicable by dire economic conditions or a collapse 
in the material well-being of large sections of society” (O’Connell 2005). During 
times of economic scarcity, society is often divided along in-group/out-group 
identifications, with the in-group claiming rightful ownership of national resources, 
especially in the form of welfare spending by the government. However, the 
conceptualization of this theory has had to be dramatically adjusted in the post-
 Rosato 
 
10 
crisis period due to inconsistent findings. For example, some research has found 
that European far right parties have had the most electoral success in regions 
enjoying periods of economic stability and growth, particularly in the years 
following economic recovery (Mudde 2014; Halikiopoulou 2016). Some contend 
that this is largely attributable to common topics of debate during crisis-period 
elections. Voters faced with the threat of massive economic losses may be more 
inclined to elect a party with tangible experience in passing effective economic 
policy, a characteristic far right parties often do not possess. Research has found 
political debates dominated by socioeconomic issues tend to garner less support for 
far right parties than speeches or rallies, given that their narratives tend to focus on 
“gaining publicity rather than participating in policy-making activities” (Mudde 
2014). As economic stability is regained, fears about crime and immigration “crowd 
out concerns over the economic situation, inflation, and unemployment,” prompting 
a shift of popular opinion to the far right (Mudde 2014).  
As white, middle class voters feel increasingly insecure economically, panic 
about their perceived political dominance increases as well. Studies throughout 
Europe, and in Greece especially, have found that frustrations with everything from 
the perceived dominant interests of the political elite to progressive ideologies 
espoused by liberal media and vocal demands for minority rights have prompted 
“disillusioned voters who see themselves as the ‘losers’ of the system” to shift to the 
far right (Angouri 2014; Mudde 2014). Reynie contends that insecurity over the 
“loss of economic and cultural influence as globalization prompts a worldwide 
redistribution of power” is to blame (Reynie 2016). However, uncertainty over their 
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place in the domestic power structure contribute to this insecurity much more 
tangibly, creating a particularly ripe environment for populist leaders to manipulate 
party identification and ideology. It is for this reason that the rhetorical strategies of 
the right are crucial to understand. Although these fears may have easily discernable 
origins in society, being content with the understanding that recent increases in 
xenophobia, fears over national sovereignty, and moral panic are entirely organic or 
stemming from the reasons listed above misunderstands their emergence and 
disregards the way these anxieties are manipulated by Far Right rhetoric.  
 
Rhetoric of the Right: analysis and comparison 
 A close analysis of the speeches and platforms of the parties explored earlier 
in this study reveals striking similarities in the rhetorical tools used to promote 
their agenda. Narratives such as populism, nativism, in-group/out-group definition, 
winner/loser framing, blame of external factors, and condemnation of the political 
elite all serve to foment and harness the anxieties of what Nixon so saliently called 
the Silent Majority in the 1970s. In his work, From the New Deal to the New Right 
(2008), Joseph Lowndes describes the makeup of this social group as “middle class 
racially and economically anxious whites.” This formation is striking in modern 
times as well as a description of the portion of the electorate that feels threatened 
by the growing demand for minority rights and institutional change. The intention 
of this study is to analyze the way these issues are framed so that I can isolate the 
strategies they use. Furthermore, the prevalence of these same rhetorical strategies 
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among centrist parties in the US and UK suggest the discontent and unrest fomented 
by such narratives have been utilized by the Center Right to gain power.  
Two particularly prevalent examples of this are Boris Johnson, the UK 
conservative politician credited as responsible for the success of the Vote Leave 
campaign, and Donald Trump, the US Republican president. The presence of these 
rhetorical themes in the speeches of these two actors is particularly significant 
because of the roles their nations have historically played in the leadership of global 
politics. The presence of xenophobic, nativist, populist, and nationalist rhetoric in 
their campaigns suggests that the impact of far right success goes beyond their 
relatively negligible electoral representation. Far Right parties are changing the way 
issues of sovereignty, nationhood, and globalization are conceptualized by the 
electorate even in countries that have traditionally been vocal advocates of 
international cooperation and interdependence.  
The first of the rhetorical themes I found among these parties is constructed 
through the narrative of economic crisis and fears of resource scarcity. Out-group 
hostility has distinctly increased in the post-crisis period, as evidenced through the 
political prominence of campaigns focused on building walls and cracking down on 
immigration policy. However, as we have seen, economic explanations of this 
phenomenon fail to explain the timing of this ideological shift, as out-group hostility 
has grown in post-crisis recovery and previous economic downturns have not seen 
the same racialized backlash in previous administrations. Research has found that 
the effect of economic scarcity on far right success cannot be deemed “direct, 
unproblematic, and unidirectional” (O’Connell 2005).  
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Although it is true that economic insecurity and resource scarcity certainly 
play a role in increased hostility toward minorities and immigrants, much analysis 
has shown these sentiments to be intentionally fostered rather than naturally 
occurring. In Five Views on Multi-Racial Britain, Stuart Hall demonstrates how racial 
tension has been politically constructed in times of deepening economic crisis by the 
political elite. He posits that blacks, in the case of Britain in the 1970s and 80s, were 
“called upon to bear the brunt” of social unrest during economic scarcity as a way 
for the ruling elite to “concentrate the popular mind” against a tangible and 
physically distinguishable group that was not those in power (Hall 36). Hall 
contends that the method used for this refocusing of underclass discontentment was 
the rhetoric of “moral panic,” something he describes as when a group is “defined as 
a threat to societal values and interests” as a way of “crystallizing popular fears and 
anxieties which have a real basis and by providing them with a simple, concrete, 
identifiable, simple, social object, seeks to resolve them” (Hall 28).  
Significant trends have been observed in the popularity of far right parties in 
the aftermath of economic crisis (Halikiopoulou 2015, Englehart 2013, Angouri 
2014). This is attributable to the way economic issues are framed within the 
narrative of far right parties. Phenomena that bring about major socioeconomic 
shifts, such as economic crises or the “effect of globalization or de-industrialization,” 
are considered “triggers” for societal unrest (Halikiopoulou 2015).  These events 
allow the electorate to be divided into winners and losers, the latter being “those 
most affected and most likely to express their discontent” by supporting radical 
changes proposed by a far right organization (Halikiopoulou 2015). By giving those 
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who feel they are being wrongfully neglected by the system a clear set of political 
competitors, whether they be the ideological elite of the liberal party, immigrant 
workers, or racialized out-groups, the Far Right can successfully mobilize political 
passions without having to present a clear policy aimed at suturing economic crisis. 
This rhetoric has been a consistent feature of Far Right campaigns 
throughout Europe. Albrecht Glaser, a leader of AfD, has contended that the “cultural 
essence of Islam is irreconcilable with the Western world,” echoing his party’s 
condemnation of the rapid Islamisation of Germany and the cultural threat it 
poses.10 Peter Whittle, a candidate from the UKIP, has contended that the rapid 
influx of Middle Eastern immigrants has been the direct cause of “rising house prices 
and dropping standards of living” in London.11 Whatever form this sentiment takes, 
studies have shown that these examples of nativism breed “negative outgroup 
attitudes and prejudice” as well as a “preference for intergroup dominance, social 
hierarchy, and societal inequality” (Van Assche 2016). Xenophobic stances such as 
these often take the form of “ethnic scapegoating,” blaming national problems on the 
presence of foreign inhabitants and culture. This is especially true in Germany, 
where one socialist reporter claims that this rhetorical framework is reminiscent of 
NAZI Germany, which “served to divert social dissatisfaction against a minority- 
then the Jews, now the Muslims- encourage racism and nationalism, and promote 
arch-conservative and militarist goals.” Lubbers, along with many academics, claims 
these “ethnic out-group exclusionistic” tendencies are increasingly the primary 
                                                        
10 Schwarz, Peter. “Far Right Alternative for Germany adopts party programme.” 
World Socialist Web Site, May 4, 2016.  
11 Quoted in UKIP London Manifesto, 2016. 
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means of characterizing far right parties despite their political variations according 
to nationalist priorities (Lubbers 2002).  
These themes are woven through the campaign speeches and rhetoric of 
Donald Trump as well. Trump ran his campaign on an “America First” platform, 
promising to “secure and defend” the country’s borders, “stop the crisis” of 
immigration, end government corruption, and bring down a political class “that is 
owned outright by the special interests and lobbyists” (Trump, 2016). Shuster goes 
so far as to call far right parties Trump’s “doppelgangers along the Danube,” stating 
that they are aligned with him “in what they encourage voters to fear,” specifically 
migrants stealing jobs, Muslims threatening culture and security, political 
correctness threatening freedom of expression, and elite special interests (Shuster 
2016). Reynie suggests that “Trumpism” appears to be “an early US manifestation of 
populism influenced by globalization-era Europe” emphasizing evidence of its 
“unbridled demagoguery, xenophobia, condemnation of the elite, and stigmatizing 
rhetoric” as evidence that Trumpism is the “US take on heritage populism” (Reynie 
2016). Although these candidates and their respective campaigns do not specifically 
identify as far right activists, they represent the kind of ideological shift that the 
emergence of the far right has inspired, perhaps even initiated. 
Far right actors often tie the importance of economic stabilization to the 
larger necessity of reestablishing national sovereignty and showing state strength in 
international dealings. This can be attributed to the influence that economic stability 
and prosperity have on the relative geopolitical power of nations. Far right rhetoric 
expands on the fear of massive economic losses, connecting the precarious 
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geopolitical position of economically dependent countries in an insecure and 
competitive international environment. As far right ideologies are ultimately 
grounded in the politics of right wing conservatism, realism and zero-sum 
competition are assumed conceptualizations of international power dynamics. 
Realism is the belief that political actors are constantly conflicting in their efforts to 
secure power in relation to each other. According to this ideology, because all states 
exist in an anarchical international system, they protect their own assets and 
sovereignty by gaining power. Far Right parties operate according to a zero-sum 
understanding of international cooperation, meaning that the gains of another 
country directly detract from the potential gains of their own, both in terms of 
resources and power. These two attributes deeply affect the way concepts of 
international security are framed by far right parties.  
This ideological framework is important because, in an extension of blaming 
rhetoric, the far right position the current party elite as culpable for the relative loss 
of power their respective countries have suffered. The first aspect of this rhetorical 
strategy is the heavy criticism of current party elite, not only problematizing their 
decision making but also delegitimizing their effectiveness. Most importantly, this 
strategy does not place the blame on the nation but rather attempts to isolate the 
current leadership as solely responsible for the loss of international security and 
rising perception of weakness. In the case of Greece’s Golden Dawn, the party used 
their platform to “express disagreement with the government’s decisions” and 
“project blame onto the political system as a whole” (9). Vasilopoulou argues that 
Golden Dawn framed the state as “unable to limit the socioeconomic impact of the 
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crisis on individual citizens,” thereby calling into question the legitimacy of their 
leadership and their agency as government actors (2015). Furthermore, Golden 
Dawn has labeled the actions of the state as corrupt, deceptive, self-interested, and 
decadent; engaged in a level of kleptocracy that shames the nation while benefitting 
the delegitimized state. By positioning the nation as a separate entity from the state, 
a bloated and corrupt appendage, Golden Dawn is capable of problematizing the 
leadership without placing any blame their own party or alienating their voters. 
Petter Whittle of the UKIP shares many of these strategies, such as condemning the 
“biased media” and the “corrupt political elite.”12 
Johnson similarly places the blame for the vulnerability of Britain (and 
Europe as a whole) on Brussels without implicating Britain itself. He labels Brussels 
as distant and ineffectual in addressing the problems of external threats, pointing to 
their inability to address recent violence as evidence of their illegitimacy. He claims 
that the “failure” of the European experiment necessitates that Britain “control its 
own borders” or else face the consequences of an attack similar to that in Paris in 
November of 2015 (Johnson 2016). Trump, in turn, refers to Washington literally as 
a “swamp” of corruption and greed that he must drain with the help of the American 
people, condemning the “cynicism” and “elitism” of America’s “failed political 
establishment” as ineffectual (2016). These anti-statist talking points show tangible 
alignment of the ideological agenda of center-right mainstream parties and the 
steadily growing influence of the far right.  
                                                        
12 Quoted in UKIP London Manifesto, 2016. 
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Strath and Wodak (2009) capture the effects of this rhetorical strategy well, 
asserting that the framing of “major societal crises” like revolutions, wars, and 
depressions as “condensed events with iconic value… provide discursive 
foundations for building new (national) identities.” By placing blame on a 
backwards system, the party is able to frame their own potential as leaders in a 
revolutionary moment, the beginning of a new period unencumbered by the 
political mistakes of the previous leadership. An example of this is Golden Dawn, 
who claim to have the “unique mission to lead the nation into a phoenix-like 
transformation in which it will rise from the ashes of the old degenerate social 
order” (Vasilopoulou 2015).  
Donald Trump in many ways echoes this narrative. Each of his depictions of 
economic crisis are strategically followed by a structural flaw that could account for 
it, such as poor trade deals, a stifling tax plan, and government incompetence. The 
important consistency within this narrative, both among far right leaders and the US 
republican party president elect, is that of “blaming” rhetoric, a simplistic but 
carefully constructed use of language that positions the voter as a sympathetic and 
“righteous victim” that has been wrongfully subjected to distress. Angouri (2014) 
describes the construction of this narrative as involving “something… seen as being 
worse for some person or group than it could have been if matters had been 
handled differently.” He tells the American people that the future for the current 
political structure is dismal, claiming, “it’s [going to] get worse and worse” and 
“you’re going to have more World Trade Centers.” Here he suggests that the future is 
not only more economically unstable but also more vulnerable to international 
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threats under the current political regime. He goes on to claim that “on November 
8th” under his own presidency, “America’s comeback begins.” The similarity of his 
language and that of Golden Dawn is striking, with Trump also using the same 
imagery of a betrayed nation “rising up… better and stronger than ever before.”  
Part of the effectiveness of this disseminated perception of international 
insecurity is the parallel construction of a narrative that frames the world outside 
the nation state as dangerous, violent, and terrifying. As Michael Haupl of the Social 
Democrats party of Austria states, the far right “lives off the emotion of fear, and it’s 
a lot harder to take these fears away than to create them” (Shuster 2015). Many 
political scientists find that growing fear over terrorism, war, and the breakdown of 
the current international order already exist (Mudde 2014; Shuster 2015; Ghitis 
2015). Shuster argues that in times of political uncertainty, anger and fear for the 
future are natural and broadly felt emotions as people attempt to “make sense of a 
crisis that has deeply changed the status quo.” However, such fears have 
undoubtedly been exacerbated as far right parties capitalize on the mobilizing effect 
of insecurity and fear. Ghitis claims that rising tension and uncertainty over these 
topics have “given fodder to anti-immigrant politicians” from the far right “eager to 
talk about an ‘Islamic invasion’” (2015). Political Islam is certainly the central 
mobilizing fear of far right parties in Europe, referred to by the leader of Sweden’s 
Freedom Party as “the fascism of today” (Heinz-Christian Strache 2014).  
ISIS has also been a central concern to the campaign of Donald Trump, who 
has repeatedly made claims to “pursue aggressive joint and coalition military 
operations to crush and destroy ISIS” (2016). However, Trump has fomented fear 
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with regards to a number of different issues, including loss of international 
hegemony, immigration of dangerous people, and rampant corruption within the 
government. On the day Trump launched his campaign he labeled Mexican 
immigrants as “people with lots of problems” who are bringing dangers into the 
country such as drugs, crime, and rape (2015). Trump’s inflated rhetoric here and 
elsewhere in his campaign are typical of the fear mongering of the far right, an 
accusation left wing parties leveled against the Leave Campaign as well.  
Nevertheless, the ability of far right parties to voice the sentiments of the 
population, however unfounded they may be, wins over the trust and sympathy of 
voters that are disenchanted by the political system. Shuster makes the point that in 
times of uncertainty “perception is reality… it hardly matters that such feelings may 
not be grounded in fact.” The combination of these two narratives, the first 
destroying the legitimacy and efficacy of current government structures and the 
second warning of the dangers encroaching on the nation state, serve to mobilize 
high numbers of passionate and fearful voters.  
Although the threat of dangerous immigrants has been an important aspect 
of far right campaign platforms, the majority of anti-immigration rhetoric has been 
framed according to two of the principles listed above, namely in-group/out-group 
distinction and immigrant demonization. Romanticizing the ideological and cultural 
alignment of the native “in-group” allows far right parties to frame immigrants as 
“other” and “undesirable.” For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has 
campaigned for “building razor-wire fences on the border of Serbia” in the interest 
of protecting “Europe’s Christian identity” from the newcomers (van Spanje 2011). 
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Since his push to build a physical barrier between Hungary and Serbia, Orban’s 
party, Fidesz, has gained considerable popular support. UK conservative party MP 
Enoch Powell expressed this sentiment as early as 1968, identifying immigrants as a 
separate collective entity capable of “organiz[ing] to consolidate their members, to 
agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens” as well as “overawe and 
dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed 
have provided” (van Spanje 2011). In both of these examples immigrants are 
referred to not a part of the collective nation state but rather a separate and 
unassimilated entity constantly threatening to overpower the natural social order.  
Beyond this native-immigrant distinction, far right parties also seek to 
demonize immigrant elements in their nation, culturally and criminally. In an 
international congress of far right leaders, parties came together to focus on 
methods to “protect the national identity in [their] respective countries and co-
operate to win the battle against globalization” (Englehart 2013). At the conference 
party leaders discussed the reality of “opening the flood gates of immigration,” 
mentioning that the influx of “undesirables,” whose “criminal records are unknown” 
present a direct threat to the stability and safety of their respective countries 
(Englehart 2013).  
Trump perpetuates this narrative as well, claiming that among 
undocumented immigrants there are “at least 2 million convicted criminal aliens.” 
He speaks of Muslim immigration like a disease, describing “generation of 
radicalism and terrorism spreading and growing within our shores” (Trump 2016). 
Mexican immigration, according to Trumpian rhetoric, is more like a wave of 
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immoral and bloodthirsty thugs, bringing with them “massive crime, and massive 
drugs -- including a terrible heroin problem.” But the threat of immigrants, the far 
right asserts, is much more profound than simply rising crime rates and increased 
exposure to terrorism. “What’s at stake,” one leader of the Swiss People’s Party 
claims, “is your mortal soul.” The leaders of the Future of Nationalist Movements 
conference go on to discuss the cultural threat of “creeping sharia” and “stealth 
jihad,” language coined by the far right to name the gradual takeover of Islamic 
values in a Christian-dominated, white Europe. Once again, by blaming “other” 
groups, in this case immigrants, for the denigration and corruption of society, the far 
right illustrates the frustrations of the voters without isolating or alienating any 
possible native support.  
Finally, the nationalist rhetoric employed by the Far Right has been used to 
strengthen sentiments of patriotism and anti-globalization. Nationalism is 
commonly understood in modern political analysis as the prioritization by the state 
of domestic needs and identity. Helleiner and Pickel expand on this understanding 
by arguing that although this ideology usually promotes protectionist and 
exclusionary state policies, if the best course of action for a state is to engage openly 
in the political or economic interactions of nation states then nationalist policy will 
reflect that (Helleiner 2005). Although policies relating to state reformation and 
reimagining of the status quo are not traditionally nationalistic policies, their 
prioritization in the context of European integration is a nationalist agenda. The use 
of this rhetoric serves to make the far right palatable to a wider electorate, 
promoting ideas such as sovereignty to satisfy concerns over relative geopolitical 
 Rosato 
 
23 
strength and nationhood to address out-group hostility and racism. Rhetoric 
relating to “national pride” and “law and order” and “state sovereignty” has echoed 
across Europe as well as within Donald Trump’s campaign. Poland’s Law and Justice 
party took power in 2005 using the same rhetorical strategies that were successful 
for Trump in 2016, prioritizing claims such as “Poland first” and “law and order” 
over concrete policy proposals (Hockenos 2010). Golden Dawn’s success has been 
attributed to their ability to provide “an alternative vision for Greece based on 
national pride and defiant antagonism against the status quo” as well as their 
promises to cleanse the nation of “enemies both internal (political dissidents) and 
external (the EU, the IMF, immigrants, and foreigners”(Vasilopoulou 2015). These 
concepts and the prioritization of the nation and its interests are all key attributes of 
nationalistic policy and are consistently present in the far right agenda, calling on 
the restoration of a white, Christian, sovereign nation state. 
 
Conclusions: The Impact of the Far Right Trend 
The potential of the far right has been consistently underestimated in 
elections across Europe and America. This may be in part because should not be 
considered a collective political movement, but rather separate political parties 
pursuing various conservative agendas. Although their rhetorical strategies are 
nearly identical and are constructed through the influence of the same popular 
sentiments, they often do not align on economic, political, or even social issues. 
Some, such as Pia Kjærsgaard of Denmark, combine their xenophobic rhetoric with 
promises of high welfare spending and state planning, flying in the face of 
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understandings of the American Right.13 Furthermore, France’s National Front 
advocates for the privatization of banks and major industries, a stark contrast to the 
corporatism of Trump’s campaign. Parties of the Far Right have advocated starkly 
different strategies, but each has used the same language to do so.  
 The narrative of the Far Right appeals to the same base desires in the 
electorate, such as belonging in the dominant social group or being protected from 
those with different cultural values or social norms. The efficiency of these 
narratives to provoke social panic about declining morality, racial tension and 
national sovereignty has created a new responsiveness in voters typically aligned 
with centrist parties. As these anxieties, worsened by the vocal organization of their 
opposition, become more prevalent, they invite the adoption of this same rhetoric 
by Center Right parties seeking to mobilize the same political passions. The 
influence of the Far Right, therefore, cannot simply be reduced to their limited 
electoral success. The success of the narrative they have constructed, despite the 
different ideological agendas it was used to promote, has prompted a shift not only 
in the rhetorical strategies of traditionally moderate parties but also in the policies 
and ideologies they promote, as evidenced by the popularity of Trump’s wall and 
Boris’s ideal of “London for the Londoners.” As this kind of corrosive and divisive 
language becomes more salient in mainstream political discourse, it will continue to 
construct ideologies and value systems in the broader electorate that are predicated 
on misplaced anxieties and discontentment rather than addressing structural 
inefficiencies or tangible political solutions.  
                                                        
13 Farago, Jason. “Comparative Far Right Politics, US and Europe.” The Guardian, 
April 26, 2012.  
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These sentiments have eluded measurement by traditional polls because 
they are not captured by the ideological alignment of a voter with a party platform 
or with the policy promoted by a particular candidate. Although the results of the 
Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump may have come as a surprise to 
pollsters and mainstream media, they may have been more accurately predicted by 
a rhetorical analysis of chat rooms and facebook profiles, or perhaps the readership 
of right wing media outlets such as Breitbart News or the Alternative Right. These 
sources more accurately predict the social sentiments that are stimulated by the 
campaigns of the Far Right, sentiments that may go unnoticed by polling sites that 
attempt to measure political opinions.  
So what political and economic impacts can we expect from this ideological 
shift? The first and most pressing shift to come will be along our national borders. 
Physical barrier building has been a common campaign promise in a number of 
countries, representing the level of commitment these parties have to nativist ideals. 
However, immigration law in general stands to undergo a massive shift in the way it 
is conceptualized and enforced given the UK’s rejection of the Schengen zone and 
Trump’s promise to deport thousands of immigrants. Despite indications over the 
last several decades that we should expect increased economic and political 
interconnectedness as globalization becomes more pronounced, this research seems 
to suggest that the opposite is true. As interconnectedness threatens constructed 
conceptions of declining cultural and racial homogeneity and national security, we 
may see increased support of these extreme far right parties. This is especially true 
now that the two nations that have historically sacrificed the most as hegemons in 
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the interest of international stability and cooperation are controlled by parties and 
actors that support and disseminate these perceptions.  
Additionally, this trend may indicate the possibility of an impending era of 
economic closure. Whether this is attributable to the fall of America as a stabilizing 
force in the international arena or simply the increase of nationalistic preferences 
due to the sacrifices of interconnectedness in the wake of the economic crisis, it may 
be too soon to tell. It is sobering, however, to look at the steady increase in 
protectionist language, especially that coming from Britain and the United States.  
Finally, this analysis suggests that the more prominent Far Right rhetoric 
becomes in political discourse, the more effective it will be in influencing centrist 
voters. This would indicate that unless this discourse can be deconstructed and the 
work that its doing be neutralized, we may see an increasingly pronounced 
radicalization of the Right throughout the international system. It is important that 
the racist, xenophobic, and isolationist sentiments emerging as a result of these 
strategies are isolated from the true frustrations of middle class voters. Moreover, it 
is important that the divisive rhetoric of the Far Right be brought under control 
before the fear, anger, and hatred that its populism promotes continues to breed 
radicalism, inequality, and violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Rosato 
 
27 
Bibliography 
Angouri, Jo, and Ruth Wodak. "‘They Became Big In The Shadow Of The Crisis’: The 
Greek Success Story And The Rise Of The Far Right." Discourse & Society 25.4 
(2014): 540-565. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Assche, Jasper Van, Arne Roets, Jonas De Keersmaecker, and Alain Van Hiel. "The 
Mobilizing Effect of Right-Wing Ideological Climates: Cross-Level Interaction 
Effects on Different Types of Outgroup Attitudes." Political Psychology 
(2016). JSTOR. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. 
Creighton, Mathew J., Amaney Jamal, and Natalia C. Malancu. "Has Opposition To 
Immigration Increased In The United States After The Economic Crisis? An 
Experimental Approach." International Migration Review 49.3 (2015): 727-
756. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Engelhart, Katie. "Rise Of The Far Right." Maclean's 126.48/49 (2013): 26-30. 
Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Ghitis, Frida. "Anti-Refugee Backlash Will Benefit Europe's Far-Right Parties." World 
Politics Review (Selective Content) (2015): 1. Academic Search Premier. Web. 
11 Nov. 2016. 
Hall, Stuart. Five Views of Multi-racial Britain: Talks on Race Relations Broadcast by 
BBC TV. London: Commission for Racial Equality, 1978. Print. 
Halikiopoulou, Daphne and Tim Vlandas. "The Rise Of The Far Right In Debtor And 
Creditor European Countries: The Case Of European Parliament Elections." 
Political Quarterly 86.2 (2015): 279-288. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 
Nov. 2016. 
 Rosato 
 
28 
Hockenos, Paul. "Central Europe's Right Wing Populism." The Nation (2010): 18-21. 
JSTOR. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. 
Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. "Extreme Right-Wing Voting 
in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 41.3 (2002): 345-
378. Print. 
Mudde, Cas. "The Far Right And The European Elections." Current History 113.761 
(2014): 98-103. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
O'Connell, Michael. "Economic Forces And Anti-Immigrant Attitudes In Western 
Europe: A Paradox In Search Of An Explanation." Patterns Of Prejudice 39.1 
(2005): 60-74. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Renman, V. (2014). Political crossroads ahead in Sweden: The signs are red-
green European Policy Institutes Network. Retrieved from 
http://ccl.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/164
1843291?accountid=10141 
Reynié, Dominique. "’Heritage Populism’ And France's National Front." Journal Of 
Democracy 27.4 (2016): 47-57. Academic Search Premier. Web. 30 Nov. 2016. 
Shuster, Simon. "Europe Swings Right." Time 188.13 (2016): 30-35. Academic Search 
Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Spechler, Martin C. "Economic Nationalism In A Globalizing World." Nations & 
Nationalism 12.2 (2006): 360-362. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 
2016. 
 Rosato 
 
29 
van Spanje, Joost. "The Wrong And The Right: A Comparative Analysis Of 'Anti-
Immigration' And 'Far Right' Parties." Government & Opposition 46.3 (2011): 
293-320. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Various."The Voter's Self Defense System." Project Vote Smart. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
Vasilopoulou, Sofia, and Daphne Halikiopoulou. "Greek Politics." World Affairs 178.3 
(2015): 13-18. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Nov. 2016. 
